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Abstract
In this study we integrated the modernization and dependency theories of
development to suggest the ways whereby militarization can affect 
development. We examined the effects of three components of militarization
highlighted in these theories on the social development of ninety-two 
developing countries. Overall, our findings support the dependency theory’s 
emphasis on the detrimental impact of international trade on disadvantaged
nations. There is a significant negative correlation between arms import and
social development. Arms export and indigenous spending are correlated with
social development in the expected directions but their beta coefficients are 
not significant. The diverse ways these three aspects of militarization have 
been shown to affect social development help to explain some of the 
conflicting findings in the literature and point to the need to study these 
variables in their disaggregated form. 
The nations of the world are spending an inordinate amount on their mili-
tary budgets. According to Sivard’s World Military and Social Expenditures
(1987), in 1984 the world’s military budget was about US $769 billion,
$150 billion of which came from the developing nations. This represented
5.6 per cent of the latter’s GNP, surpassing their budgets for education and
health which together made up only 5.1 per cent of this total. The military
expenditure in these countries seems to be extraordinarily high, especially
when the provision of health, education, and other social programs (and not
arming the nation) are often their touted goals.
This investment in militarization would perhaps have been justified if
there is strong evidence to show that militarization benefits development,
but research findings on this issue are far from reassuring. Benoit’s classic
study (1973, 1978) found that countries with larger defense budgets dis-
played higher economic growth when controlling for investment and bilat-
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eral aid. Fredericksen and Looney (1982, 1983) came to a similar conclu-
sion studying the better endowed developing nations. Deger and Sen (1983)
argued that these results are exaggerated. Rosh (1986), Moon and Dixon
(1986), and Biswas and Ram (1986) found no significant relationship be-
tween militarization and development. In direct contradiction to Benoit’s
finding, Faini et al. (1984) found a 0.13 per cent decrease in production rate
accompanying every 10 per cent increase in defense spending. Lim’s findings
(1983) also confirmed this harmful effect of militarization on economic
growth.
Given the contradictions between the spending realities and the articu-
lated priorities among the Third World nations, and the controversial find-
ings in the literature, interesting questions arise. Does military spending
accelerate economic growth? Or do these expenditures divert valuable and
rare resources from development? Or, to ask a more fundamental question:
What effect does militarization have on development? The answer to this
question is especially relevant given the political tensions, skirmishes and
war generated by, among other things, the arms race among the Gulf states,
and the starvation resulting in no small extent from internal and external
strife facing the African nations.
Two divergent theoretical frameworks
This study seeks a theoretically informed approach to answer this question
on the relationship between militarization and development in the Third
World. Two theories which have influenced social scientists in the field of
development are modernization and dependency. The assumptions associ-
ated with these theories are different, and lead to very different views of de-
velopment ; and consequently, militarization. These two theories will be used
here as heuristic devices to highlight what divergent assumptions can bring
to research on this topic. We shall attempt to reconcile the differences and
develop an understanding on the effects of militarization and development.
Parsons’ (1966, 1977) and Eisenstadt’s (1966, 1987) modernization theo-
ries are sophisticated theoretical models. The treatment here will not do jus-
tice to their ideas, but serves to focus on their more basic tenets and to
delineate the role militarization can play in development. Modernization
theory posits that development is linear and the complex industrial societies
in the West represent the model or ideal for the rest of the world. Develop-
ment occurs when Third World countries abandon their particularistic, sim-
ple, and atomistic existence to follow in the footsteps of the West and adopt
its complex social systems. The building of the nation state, industrializa-
tion, urbanization, and bureaucratization, and the concomitant values
undergirding these institutions characterizing the West are hallmarks of
modernization.
Militarization, which has almost always been based on the bureaucratic
model and the transfer of technology from the West, necessarily represents
progress. Moreover, its effects are not confined to one institution but spill
over to others. Benoit (1973, 1978) argued that militarization provides the
prerequisites of stability and security needed for economic growth. It pro-
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vides extensive training, fosters research and development, raises aggregate
demand, utilizes idle resources, increases output, and promotes economic
progress. Janowitz (1964), Levy (1971), and Pye (1968) focused on the
broader social implications of militarization. They argued that the military
is an agent of and catalyst for change with innovations introduced here be-
ing a conduit to introduce Western values - such as living and working by
the clock, thriftiness, following instructions, etc. - necessary for moderni-
zation. The military breaks down traditional parochialism and builds a sense
of nationhood. The technologies and know-how used in defense can be ap-
plied to other industries, and the organization and management skills asso-
ciated with the military machinery may be adopted by other social
organizations (Levy, 1971).
Again, we shall not be drawn into a discourse on the subtle variations
among the dependency theorists or on their limitations (Brenner, 1977;
Garst, 1985), but shall instead elaborate on their major propositions as they
relate to our topic. Unlike modernization theorists who see social change in
aggregate terms, such as a rise in GNP, increases in industrial output, and
the creation of other infrastructures modelled on the West, they value the
human aspect of development (Amin, 1976). To them, industrialization or
increased GNP does not necessarily represent development; these changes
are relevant only if they benefit the population. If the benefits are confined
to the few or, in some cases, leave the country, only economic growth and
not development has taken place. Education, housing, medical care, and
other social programs and the sharing of these provisions are better yard-
sticks of development than economic growth.
Dependency theorists focus on the inequities in international relations
and the negative impact integration into the world trade and political orders
have brought to the developing world (Frank, 1969, 1973; Wallerstein,
1974, 1980, 1989; Kaldor, 1978). These unequal relations may not be en-
tirely responsible for their backwardness, but they certainly condition, if not
strangle, development in these nations (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). In the
unequal structures of exchange in international relations, the advanced or
metropole countries dictate terms of trade and political or other social ar-
rangements which benefit themselves but strangle or lead to disarticulated
development in the developing or peripheral nations. Even when participa-
tion in the world economy brings immediate ’progress’, the new
infrastructural arrangements generally cater to the needs of the advanced
foreign countries and not the indigenous ones. These changes may carry im-
mediate and short-term benefits, but the elites and not the general populace
are usually the beneficiaries. In the long run such ’progress’ may even be
detrimental to these countries.
Militarization is only one of the many factors impinging on a country’s
development, and dependency theorists seldom focus on its role in develop-
ment. However one can extrapolate from their arguments to develop a pic-
ture of the role of militarization within this paradigm. Following their
argument on disarticulated development, the dependency theorists would
likely see militarization putting pressure on the scarce supplies of skilled
workers and capital in these nations. New military installations divert re-
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sources from production to satisfy basic needs and much needed social pro-
grams. Even if militarization creates jobs and raises production rates, these
programs are not necessarily the most appropriate for these nations at their
stage of development. Consequently, the benefits from these military pro-
grams do not necessarily spread to other industries because these technolo-
gies may be too advanced to be useful to or absorbed by other industries.
Furthermore, such installations may even bolster the political and economic
power of an oppressive elite responsible for their country’s peripheral status
in the first place.
In addition, militarization, which often involves the import of arms, ties
these countries to their suppliers and perpetuates their subservience in the
international order. The manner in which this process occurs is best articu-
lated by Albrecht et al. (1974) who argued that the colonialist era created
an economic infrastructure whereby the Third World became dependent on
the First World for, among other things, military goods. These arrangements
have facilitated the expansion of the West and guaranteed the dependent
positions of these developing nations; and the advanced nations are quick
to suppress any attempts to loosen the bonds or change the status quo. This
phenomenon constitutes underdevelopment, that is, these nations are not
given the opportunity to develop their potential.
Reconciliation and focus of the study
It is obvious from the above discussion that these two paradigms have very
different views of militarization and development. The modernization para-
digm focuses on the indigenous military infrastructures within the develop-
ing countries, whereas the dependency approach emphasizes military
iinports and the disarticulated development represented and brought about
by military programs. To the modernization theorists development is prima-
rily reflected in the country’s aggregate economic and other material per-
formances, whereas the dependency theorists view it as social progress to be
shared by the population. Their different emphases, however, are not con-
tradictory - they only represent different dimensions of the saine two con-
cepts. Indigenous installations and endogenous spending are the Janus face
of militarization, and economic progress and social services are both inte-
gral components of development.
As a consequence of their different foci, the two paradigms of develop-
ment have very different ideas as to how militarization can shape develop-
ment. Nevertheless the paths they envisage as to how the former impinges
on the latter are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, as we shall see
below, these can be readily integrated to provide a useful and comprehen-
sive framework to capture the complicated relations between these two com-
plex social phenomena.
In their optimism, modernization theorists have examined the positive
effects of military expenditures spent inside a country, overlooking the pos-
sibility that such investments may go abroad. The dependency theorists’
emphasis on the global economy exposes this oversight. Military expendi-
tures are not necessarily expended at home, but can be used to import arms
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from abroad. This suggests that military programs can be examined in at
least two respects - the expenditures devoted to the internal military infra-
structure and that on military imports.
Furthermore, dependency theorists have alluded to not only the losses
brought about by arms import but the benefits accrued to the advanced na-
tions supplying them. Following the logic of this argument, developing coun-
tries exporting arms should also benefit; and dependency theorists, like
Luckham (1978), are sensitive to the presence and potential advantages of
such arms export. Therefore, the export of arms is a third dimension of
militarization to be considered.
There are of course other aspects to this complex phenomenon of
militarization. The build-up of arms can be used for defensive or offensive
purposes, and this specific military goal can shape the size of the military
budget, the strength of the armed forces and other supporting personnel, the
organization of the military complex, and the types and quantities of weap-
onry. There are also related aspects of militarization, such as, the military
control of the state and the amount of military aid. We do not wish to dwell
on these more complex and technical aspects. Instead we shall follow only
the arguments in the modernization-dependency debate and concentrate on
the above-mentioned three aspects of militarization - military installations
at home, military spending abroad, and the value of arms export. Further-
more, for the sake of simplicity and quantification, we shall represent the
complexities of military installations by the military budget expended at
home.’ I
Development is as complex, if not a more complicated concept than
militarization. Again, the modernization-dependency debate shows quite
clearly that development can incorporate both economic and social dimen-
sions. For a start, we shall concentrate in this study on only one of these di-
mensions. Most existing studies on militarization and development,
however, were carried out by economists and political scientists who used
GNP or its growth rate as the indicators of development often to the neglect
of the social aspect.’ This analysis compensates for this omission by adopt-
ing an index of development supported by the International Peace Research
Association (1978) which deals exclusively with basic human needs. This in-
dex only includes three items: infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy;
but these indicators are more comprehensive than their number suggests.
They measure not so much the social services the country provides, but the
effectiveness of these programs which is the ultimate goal of development.
The exclusive use of social indicators to measure this often ignored but vital
aspect of development will bias our measure towards the dependency ap-
proach.
Decomposing militarization into its three components allows us to easily
delineate the ways in which the former can affect social development. Fol-
lowing the arguments of the dependency approach, militarization creates or
perpetuates underdevelopment when a country imports arms. Valuable for-
eign exchange is drained from the nation, and capital investment for the
other industrial and social programs suffer. Arms import therefore should
undermine social development. On the other hand, a nation will benefit if it
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is an exporter of arms. Arms export has enriched the developed nations and
allowed them to maintain their dominance in the world economy; and there-
fore developing nations engaged in these activities should also reap such ben-
efits. Since the outflow of foreign exchange which usually characterizes the
Third World has been reversed in this situation, the cash inflow should pro-
vide the capital for other industrial investments and social programs.
Whether the creation of an indigenous military industrial structure will
benefit development is more controversial. Modernization theorists have
argued that militarization generates employment and material wealth for the
nations. There may also be spillover effects to other social institutions which
accelerate these countries’ overall development. The dependency theorists do
not deny that this is possible, but think that these benefits are limited be-
cause most of these countries do not have the infrastructural prerequisites
to take full advantage of these opportunities. Even if military programs pro-
vide immediate employment, there is usually a time lag before the social ben-
efits are felt. Furthermore, such diversions of resources to military
investment may even hurt their economic and social programs.
Both the modernization and dependency theorists agree that
militarization can bring positive consequences, but the dependency theorists
are more skeptical. They take note of the possible negative effects, and ar-
gue that the prevalence of the positive ones is contingent to a large extent
on the state of readiness of the Third World countries to take advantage of
them. Given the low level of development in these nations, it is likely the
negative consequences may cancel out the positive ones, making any corre-
lation between internal militarization and development a tenuous and pos-
sibly a negative one.
These considerations convince us that the relevant research question in
the study of militarization and development is no longer whether the former
has a positive or negative impact on the latter. A more fruitful approach is
to ascertain how the different components of militarization shape the differ-
ent dimensions of development. The following is a step in this direction, al-
beit a limited one. Following the pointers in the two development paradigms,
the analysis will concentrate only on three facets of militarization. We hy-
pothesize that a military program that depends upon imports will drain the
nation’s wealth and hurt social development, whereas one with a strong mili-
tary industrial base which allows the country to sell arms will bring benefits
to the nation. Furthermore, we hypothesize that the creation and mainte-
nance of an indigenous military infrastructure will have a less significant
impact on social development.
The data set
The best way to test our hypotheses would be to carry out a multinational
and longitudinal study over an extended period of time, and the informa-
tion further embellished by case studies. The pursuit of such methodologi-
cal rigour, however, has to be compromised with the availability of quality
data and the limitations imposed by a paper of this length. We settled for a
cross-sectional analysis while fully recognizing its limitations, the advantages
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of the longitudinal approach (Tuma and Hannan, 1984: 12-14), and the
richness of data coming from case analysis. We carried out regression analy-
sis on the data collected on ninety-two nations in 1982 because information
on militarization and social development for these countries in this year is
most complete.
Military programs are susceptible to changes in international and na-
tional politics. However, an examination of Facts on File shows that no
’traumatic’ occurrences took place in the early 1980s to dramatically change
the world balance of power or to make 1982 any more unique than other
years in the recent period. The situation in the Middle East, and especially
in Lebanon, has always been volatile. The OPEC countries were negotiating
to reduce their oil output but the rich oil-producing Arab countries were
excluded in our sample. The major political development in 1981-82 was
the growing challenge of the Solidarity movement to the Polish government,
but neither Poland nor other members of the Eastern European bloc nations
are among the countries being studied here.
Multinational analysis does not facilitate studying the situation of each
nation specifically, but we did attempt to take into account the different
political contexts of the nations selected. Political scientists have shown that
military spending is affected by the political alignment of countries to the
Eastern or Western bloc, their involvement in internal strife or external war,
the nature of the government (whether democratic/autocratic, civilian/mili-
tary) and the presence of the military base (Looney, 1988, 1990; Maizels and
Nissanke, 1986; Rosh, 1988). The scope of this paper will not allow us to
explore the role of all these factors; instead we controlled for their influences
by including seven dichotomous variables measuring these situations in our
regression model. These are: threat or involvement in external wars, source
of arms supplies, offensive or defensive nature of the military, internal strife,
political alignment with Eastern or Western bloc, the presence of foreign
military bases, and the nature of the government.
In choosing countries for our sample, we use the criterion established by
the World Bank and select only those with less than a GNP of US $7075 per
capita in 1982. This limit excludes nations with high incomes, such as the
oil-exporting Arab countries which constitute a unique category of their
own. According to the data provided in Sivard’s Military and Social Ex-
penditure 1985, 110 nations should have been included, but eighteen coun-
tries are eliminated due to inadequate information. Still, this list is one of
the largest number of cases included in a study of this nature (see appendix).
Other data needed for the analysis comes from the United States Arms Con-
trol and Development Agency Report, World Military Expenditures and
Arnis Transfer (1986), Ruth Sivard’s Military and Social Expenditures
(1985), and Kidron and Smith’s The War Atlas (1983).’
The three items used to create our dependent variable - infant mortal-
ity, literacy rate, and life expectancy - were subjected to a principal com-
ponent factor analysis. As we expected, all three items loaded highly on to
only one factor. To create the social development index, we standardized
and then weighted each item according to its explanatory power, using the
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derived function coefficients. The resultant index has a mean of 0 and a
maximum score of +3. A negative score indicates a low level of development,
and a positive score a high level of development amongst our sample.
Both arms imports and exports are measured as a proportion of the coun-
try’s total imports or exports. These measures, standardized by the values
of the total import or export, allow for better comparison across nations.
Furthermore, the percentage of arms import also reflects the amount of re-
sources leaving the nations in order to get military goods as opposed to other
imports which may have a more beneficial impact on the nation. Similarly,
arms export as a percentage of the total exports provides indications of the
size of the arms export industry as opposed to other export-oriented indus-
trial activities.
The mean arms import in our sample is 6.3 per cent with a standard de-
viation of 11.6 per cent. Twenty-seven nations, or 29 per cent in our sam-
ple, did not import arms in 1982; but the arms import of Syria and
Afghanistan valued close to 58 per cent of their total import. This high fig-
ure in arms import in Syria stems from her involvement in the
Israel-Lebanon conflict, and the situation in Afghanistan was volatile with
its president ousted, the Soviets occupying the country, and continuing fac-
tional fights.
Only fifteen of the ninety-two countries exported arms in 1982, and
among them, only six countries had arms exports worth more than 1 per
cent of its total exports. Consequently, the mean score for arms export is
only 0.4 per cent with a standard deviation of 1.6. This low mean score and
small standard deviation for this variable may affect the correlation coeffi-
cient and as we shall see later, attenuate the effects of arms export on devel-
opment.
Indigenous militarization is measured as the portion of military expendi-
tures spent only inside the country and standardized by the size of the popu-
lation. We did not standardize military expenditure by GNP as other studies
have done because we have included the latter as an independent variable.
Instead we use per capita which measures the size of the military burden on
each member of the population. The nations in the sample spent an average
of $54 per capita on indigenous militarization in 1982 with a range of $1 to
$1155.
Gross national product, which has often been used as an indicator of de-
velopment, is used here as a control. To do this is not to deny the influence
militarization may have on GNP or economic development, but to recognize
the reciprocity of this relationship. A cursory examination of the data reveals
a strong correlation between the two variables. Countries with over $1500
GNP per capita spent an average of $205 per person on total military ex-
penditures and have a mean development score of +0.97. On the other hand,
countries with less than $400 GNP per capita spent only an average of $9
per person on this item, and have a development score of -0.88. Indeed these
crude correlations provide support to the modernization theorists’ position
that militarization affects economic and social development positively. The
same data, however, can be interpreted as indicative of the ability of the
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richer countries to have more expensive military and also social programs.
Treating GNP together with the seven variables mentioned earlier as extra-
neous allows us to factor out their effects and to examine more closely the




As a first step in our analysis, we inspected the zero-order correlations be-
tween the exogenous variables and the three indicators of militarization.
These results are shown in Table 1. Indigenous spending per capita is posi-
tively correlated with GNP, orientation of the military, and war. Arms im-
port is positively associated with military orientation, internal strife, war,
and the existence of foreign military bases; but is negatively correlated with
the type of the regime and alignment. Finally, arms export is positively cor-
related with GNP, the supplier, and the existence of foreign military bases,
and negatively correlated with military orientation. The theoretical expla-
nation for these results is too complicated to be elaborated here; suffice to
say that they overlap with findings in the literature. These results, showing
the three dimensions of militarization being shaped by very different factors,
further suggest that these indicators represent different activities that should
be examined separately. More importantly, all the exogenous variables are
significantly correlated to at least one of the militarization indicators justi-
fying their incorporation as controls.
Table 1: Zero-order coefficients between exogenous variables and indicators of
militarization.
* significant at a 0.05 level
Table 2 displays the simple bivariate relationships between the three as-
pects of militarization and social development, and their zero-order correla-
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tions. The bivariate tables provide a description of the data. Arms imports,
exports, and indigenous militarization are trichotomized to provide maxi-
mum homogeneity within groups while maintaining more or less compara-
ble numbers, and their mean social development scores are provided for
comparison.
Table 2: Average score on the social development scale by the level of arms imports,
indigenous militarization and arms exports and zero-order correlations.
&dquo; difference are not significant at a .05 level
&dquo;~ data for Guinea is not complete and is excluded here
.’ differences are significant at a .OS level
*difference between non-exporters and exporters (high and low exporters combined) are
significant at a 0.05 level.
The first sub-table in Table 2 shows a significant negative correlation be-
tween arms import and social development, showing that increasing arms
imports is related to lower levels of development. The impression is con-
firmed to some extent by comparing the mean scores on social development
among the three groups of nations divided on their involvement in arms im-
port. It is however interesting to note that among the three groups of na-
tions, the middle importer group scores highest on the development scale.
The results in the second bivariate table show a significant positive corre-
, 
lation between indigenous militarization and development. Countries that
spend over $30 per capita on military programs have a development score
of +0.57 compared with a -0.59 score for the third group spending less than
$10 per capita on that item.
In the third bivariate table, countries that do not export arms have a de-
velopment score of -0.11 whereas those that do so have the respective scores
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of +0.48 and +0.72, with the high exporters having the highest development
score. The trichotomised results show that arms exports affect development
in the expected direction, and the results are significant when the develop-
ment scores of the exporter nations are compared with those of the non-ex-
porters. The insignificant zero-order correlation coefficient between these
two variables is perhaps affected by the small deviations in the export vari-
able noted earlier.
To examine the complex relations between militarization and social de-
velopment more closely, a multivariate ordinary least squares regression pro-
cedure was employed. The results which can be seen in Table 3 depict the
effects of all eight exogenous variables and the three dimensions of
militarization on social development. Together, the model explains 52 per
cent of the variance in development.
Table 3: Results of ordinary least squares regression with social development as the
dependent variable
Among the eight control variables, only GNP and the nature of govern-
ance have any significant influence on social development. The former has a
standardized beta coefficient of +0.58 and the latter +0.24. These results are
similar to findings in the literature which suggest that social development is
contingent on the available economic resources and is mediated by the na-
ture of the government’s responsiveness to popular demands (Looney 1988,
1990). As for the effects of militarization, only arms import has a significant
negative correlation of -0.25 with the index of social development. The two
beta coefficients between indigenous militarization and arms export on one
hand and social development on the other are insignificant at the 0.05 level.
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The relationship between arms import and development is clear. The re-
sults of both the bivariate and regression analyses suggest a negative corre-
lation supporting the dependency theorists’ position that the greater tie of
the developing nations to the global military economy is detrimental. Our
empirical data do not provide information as to how these military imports
can be harmful, but neither do they disprove the dependency theorists’ ar-
gument that arms import can hurt social development in more ways than
one. Importing arms means the outflow of material resources, a cut in the
budget for social programs, and undermining the population’s well-being.
The military input may embody advanced technology, but if a nation is not
capable of producing these arms, it is also not likely to be able to incorpo-
rate these advanced technologies in industrial use in the immediate future.
Moreover, buying military equipment means a divestment of resources from
industries which can generate income - a necessary prerequisite to the pro-
vision of social services.
Despite the consistent results in the bivariate table and the regression
analysis, the curvilinear relationship between arms import and social devel-
opment in Table 2 needs to be explained. The curvilinear relationship dis-
played in the trichotomized bivariate table may be a function of the level of
economic development in these three groups of countries and the value of
their arms import as a proportion of their import trade. In our sample, the
non-importers have slightly lower per capita GNPs than countries import-
ing some arms, and this perhaps accounts for their lower development score.
The high importers spent an average of 17 per cent of their import budgets
on this item with some nations spending as much as 30-50 per cent. Tying
such high proportions of their resources to arms import prevents them from
bringing in more ’useful’ or income-generating commodities as well as di-
verting resources from other industrial investments and social programs. As
a result, the middle category of arms-importing countries has higher devel-
opment scores than those who import more arms and those who import less.
Indigenous militarization is positively correlated with social development
in the bivariate table, but the relationship becomes insignificant once the
control variables are introduced in the regression analysis. These contradic-
tory findings can again be explained by the level of economic development
of a country, which makes the observations of the relationship between in-
digenous militarization and social development in the simple bivariate table
spurious. Recall that GNP is significantly correlated with indigenous
militarization in Table 1 and that it is also significantly correlated with so-
cial development in the regression analysis. That is, a country with a higher
GNP can afford a larger military budget, as well as better and more com-
prehensive education and health care programs than an economically less-
endowed country. Consequently, countries with high per capita
expenditures on indigenous militarization also have better records on social
development. Hence, once the effects of GNP are controlled, the relation-
ship disappears.
More importantly, these disparate results support the tenuous empirical
relationship between indigenous militarization and social development that
we have hypothesized and also suggest a complex interplay between the vari-
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ables. Unlike military imports which primarily affect a country’s economic
resources, indigenous military spending affects installations embedded in a
nation. These military installations, as the modernization theorists have so
eloquently described them, involve a constellation of economic, social, and
cultural organizations which directly impinge on every aspect of the society.
Even in the area of social development alone, this relationship is a com-
plex one. Indigenous militarization may produce material benefits in terms
of employment and other economic spin-offs. These can be used for social
services. The diffusion of Western values with their higher standards for sat-
isfying human needs may generate a demand for social services; and a more
efficient bureaucratic structure often associated with the military may pro-
vide for a more effective distribution of social services. On the other hand,
military expenditure, even when used at home, can compete with social pro-
grams for scarce resources. That is, the opportunity costs of indigenous
militarization are high and can outweigh the benefits. Even though indig-
enous militarization can bring economic expansion and resources necessary
to finance social programs, these resources may not be put to such uses. Even
if they are, these processes take time. Moreover, the demands for better so-
cial services may come only from military personnel and the benefits may be
confined to that circle. These multifarious and sometimes contradictory
ways whereby indigenous militarization can affect social development, and
their delayed effects, explain why the relationship is insignificant here. Given
the low level of development in these countries and the lack of preparedness
to benefit from the positive effects of militarization, it should also not be
surprising that the direction of the relationship between the two variables
tends to be a negative one. These considerations call for further specifica-
tions of indigenous militarization in future analysis.
We have already alluded to the methodological explanation for the lack
of a significant relationship between arms export and social development.
Only fifteen countries are exporting arms. They are the third tier arms-pro-
duction countries (Krause, 1992), and their products are much less sophisti-
cated than those from the First World, their technology and many parts
imported, their volume of production small. The volume and values of their
military exports are low in comparison to their other exports. Arms exports
constitute only a little more than 1 per cent of their total export even in the
highest category of exporter nations in our sample. Since some of the parts
needed for the manufacture of these exports have been imported (Krause,
1992; Ball, 1991), this layout cost attenuates the positive effects of income
so gained. Furthermore, the defense industry is an integral part of the indig-
enous military infrastructure, and its effects as discussed earlier, and which
we shall not repeat here, are mixed.
Military installations geared for arms export, however, have one decided
advantage over the other indigenous military infrastructures per se - they
earn much needed foreign exchange which can subsidize military production
for home use or social programs. Consequently, military export does have a
consistently postive effect on social development. There is evidence of a pos-
sible positive correlation in the bivariate analysis and also a weak positive
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coefficient in the regression results. The consistent ways whereby arms ex-
port affects social development in the simple bivariate and the regression
analyses do suggest that developing countries manufacturing arms for ex-
port may reap some benefits from these activities.4 
4
Finally, as a cautionary note we recognize that countries develop and glo-
bal geo-political circumstances change. For example, the GNPs of Israel and
Singapore have improved in the last decade to call to question their inclu-
sion in our Third World country list. In addition, traumatic changes have
also occurred in the Eastern European countries to change the balance of
power in world politics and invalidate our dichotomy of countries into those
aligned to the Eastern and Western blocs. These global changes affect the
countries’ arms installations and their abilities to import, manufacture, or
export arms; and will alter somewhat the organization of these countries in
our data set should an analysis be done in the nineties. Even though we are
optimistic that our results will hold, whether these changes will produce fun-
damentally different results in the association between militarization and
development remain a question. Only future analyses which examine our
propositions using longitudinal data, however, will give a more definitive
answer as to whether the model developed here can withstand geo-political
changes over time.
Discussion and conclusion
The relationship between militarization and development is a complex one.
This study has focused only on the three dimensions of militarization high-
lighted in the modernization and dependency theories, and exclusively on
their effects on social development. Even within this narrow confine, each
component of militarization is found to relate to social development in its
own unique way. Arms import and indigenous militarization are negatively
correlated with social development, and arms export is positively correlated
with it. While arms import and indigenous militarization affect social devel-
opment in the same way, only the first relationship is significant at the 0.05
level. But in all these cases, the results are in the anticipated directions. The
integrative theoretical approach utilized for the analysis, which takes into
consideration the complex ways whereby the different components of
militarization can affect development, helps to explain the different influ-
ences of militarization on social development.
Our findings and their theoretical explanations provide clues to both the
absence of any significant correlations and the sometimes contradictory find-
ings in the literature. Militarization and development are complex phenom-
ena incorporating different dimensions. The different aspects of
militarization do not act on development in the same way, and positive and
negative effects can cancel each other out to produce seemingly insignificant
results. Moreover, emphasis on one or the other dimensions of these con-
cepts can yield very different results. As Ball (1988: 126) has shown in some
detail, the choice and definition of militarization and development have con-
tributed to discrepancies in findings. She has further pointed out that the
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ways in which these dimensions have been operationalized, the source of the
data, the characteristics of the sampled countries, and the particular time
period chosen, can further compound the problem. These cautionary meth-
odological warnings aside, our study alerts us to the usefulness of a theo-
retically informed approach, and the importance of decomposing
militarization and development into their constituents in order to under-
stand their inter-relations.
We have tried to integrate the modernization and the dependency theo-
ries to sort out the influences of militarization on development; but as far as
social development is concerned, the results lend greater credence to the lat-
ter than the former. Like the dependency theorists, we have to conclude that
arms imports hurts social development, the creation of an indigenous mili-
tary infrastructure does not necessarily benefit a nation, and that a nation is
likely to gain from these programs when its military complex is capable of
producing arms for sale to other countries. This last finding supports the
dependency theory; and conversely also the modernization theory specify-
ing the condition whereby militarization can be beneficial.
A core-periphery hierarchy exists even within the ranks of the developing
countries. As in the larger world economy, the core countries in the devel-
oping world are better endowed, have higher GNPs per capita, a more so-
phisticated industrial infrastructure, and higher levels of social development
than the peripheral nations without such capabilities. While these countries
sell arms, the poorer nations import them, and the wealthier nations increase
their income with monies from their less fortunate clients. The latter have
used their hard-earned and highly-valued foreign exchange for armaments
instead of machinery, other wealth-generating imports, or social programs.
These arms-exporting nations in the developing world certainly would not
have as strong a hold on their clients as their First World counterparts. Even
within the microcosm of core-periphery relationships among the developing
nations, the stronger ones still stand to benefit at the expense of the weaker
ones.
Just as the dependency theorists’ highlighting of inequities in world poli-
tics does not imply that developing nations should break out of their depend-
ency by pursuing autarkic development or following the examples of the
First World in exploiting their disadvantaged neighbours, our conclusion
should not be interpreted as the authors’ condoning or encouraging the sale
of arms among the developing nations as a means to improve their condi-
tion. It is simply an objective reality that one should be aware of. Given the
lack of resources in these countries, few among them would have the capa-
bilities to manufacture their own weaponry let alone produce arms for ex-
port, and they are more likely to buy than to sell arms. Since this is the case,
there is only one logical conclusion - increased militarization among the
developing nations will damage their social development.
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Appendix
Countries in the analysis
Afghanistan 9 algeria Argentina. Bangladesh Barbados Benin * Bo-
livia . Botswana · Brazil Burkina Faso · Burma · Burundi Cameroon ·
Central African Republic · Chad · Chile Colombia · Congo Costa Rica
- Cuba · Cyprus Dominican Republic · Ecuador · Egypt El Salvador 9
Ethiopia Fiji. Gabon Gambia · Ghana Guatemala. Guinea Guyana
o Haiti · Honduras India · indonesia Iran · Iraq 9 Israel Ivory Coast ·
Jamaica o Jordan o Kenya · South Korea Lebanon ’ · Lesotho · Liberia 0
Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Mali Malta 9 mauritania Mauritius
~ Mexico · Morocco o Mozambique 9 Nepal Nicaragua Niger * Nigeria
~ Pakistan o Panama papa New Guinea* Paraguay o Peru o Phillipines 9
Rwanda 9 Senegal * Sierre Leone Singapore. Somalia South Africa Sri
Lanka · Sudan Swaziland Syria Tanzania 9 thailand Togo. Trini-
dad + Tobago Tunisia · Turkey · Uganda · Uruguay · Venezuela Yemen
(Aden) 9 Yemen (Sanaa) 4, Zaire Gambia Zimbabwe
Notes
~ We are grateful to Professor S. S. Halli and the anonymous reviewers for their
comments on an earlier draft.
1 We acknowledge the drawbacks of reducing information on complex structures
to simple coefficients, but this is a necessary compromise one has to make in sta-
tistical analysis. Also refer to note 3 for a more detailed discussion of the meth-
odological issues.
2 Examples of exceptions are the works by Moon and Dixon (1986), and Sharda
(1988).
3 International organizations may have standard definitions of national military
expenditures, arms imports or exports, and other social indicators, but the differ-
ent accounting systems of nations supplying the information affect the validity
and reliability of the data and its comparability. Furthermore, it is difficult to
disaggregate components of military expenditures, arms imports and exports,
some of which may overlap. For example, military imports included in the na-
tion’s military budget may be used to manufacture arms for export (Krause,
1992). For further discussions on these methodological issues, see Sivard’s (1985)
section ’Notes on Data’, Chan (1991), Laurance’s (1992) section on
’Conceptualization and Measurement,’ and United States Arms Control and De-
velopment Agency (1986). For a more detailed discussion of our data set, see
Zimmer (1988), pp. 121-124.
4 Arms trade, and hence the volume of arms export, is sensitive to international
politics. The volume of such trade for these third-tier arms production countries
rose in the mid-eighties with the regional conflicts in the Middle East, and
dropped in the late eighties. Furthermore, the disintegration of the Soviet Union
and the political changes in the Eastern European bloc have introduced eager
competitors to the trade, making it more difficult to maintain let alone to join the
military export industry. Nevertheless, these fluctuations of the market should not
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